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BROWER v. EVANS:
THE COURT'S EFFORTS TO PROTECT
DOLPHINS IN THE EASTERN TROPICAL
PACIFIC OCEAN
Sarah H. McCready*
I. INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) erred when he issued, prior to
receipt of substantiating research, an Initial Finding that a certain fishing
technique did not harm dolphins.' The Secretary erroneously concluded
that the mere lack of evidence (without research) was sufficient to
substantiate his Initial Finding that there was no evidence that the fishing
technique harmed dolphins.2 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in its July 2001 decision Brower v. Evans,3 affirmed judgment in favor of plaintiff and set aside the Secretary's Initial Finding.4
The broad implication of the holding in Brower v. Evans is that the
government must comply with congressional statutes even if such laws are
contrary to international trade. The narrow holding of this case is to
continue efforts to protect dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean
(ETP)5 even though such actions might conflict with international trade.6
The Secretary's support of a less protective standard to apply to dolphin
safe tuna labels apparently applies most directly to international vessels.
Brower v. Evans represents an international trade issue because United
States vessels do not use fishing techniques that are harmful to dolphins.7

* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2003.
1. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir 2001).

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1071.
5. The ETP is an area which spans "between five and seven million square miles and
extends from the southern Californian to the South American coastlines." Id. at 1060.
6. id at 1061-62.
7. Id. at 1061.
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The Secretary's action is contrary to recent congressional acts that indicate
a trend toward protecting the ETP dolphins from certain fishing practices,
such as purse seine fishing. Such acts also indicate a growing awareness
that fishing not only causes injuries and death to dolphins, but also causes
physiological stress.'
This Casenote advocates for the court's conclusion that the Secretary's
decision to allow more relaxed tuna labeling guidelines undermines the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and congressional mandates
designed to protect dolphins.' From a policy standpoint, upholding the
Secretary's decision will thwart efforts to protect ETP dolphins.
II.BACKGROUND

The ETP is home to the yellowfin tuna.'" Dolphins are often observed
swimming immediately above tuna and consequently fishermen have used
the presence of dolphins to locate tuna. Prior to 1959, tuna were caught
with little destruction to the dolphins." In 1959, "purse seine" nets began
to be used to catch tuna.'" Fishermen use explosives, helicopters and speed
boats in order to drive the tuna, and also the dolphins, into a tight group so
that they can be encircled with purse seine nets. 3 The driving process,
known as "dolphin setting" can last from twenty minutes to an hour. ' The

8.
Brower v. Daley, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1077-78 (N.D.Cal., 2000). aftd, 257 F.3d
1058 (9th Cir 2001). "Psycho-social stressors that are likely to affect the dolphins include
separation of mother and young, separation from social groups, social aggression during net
confinement, and novelty. Other potential short-term responses of dolphins to chase and
capture include severe muscle damage, resulting in a condition known as capture myopathy
and hyperthermia. Both of these conditions could cause unobserved mortality.
The potential effects of long-term stress include stress induced pathologies, impairment
to the immune system, and impaired reproduction, growth, and metabolism. Based on
information from other mammals it seems likely that the reproductive cycle for some female
dolphins will be disrupted, either as a result of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal response
to stress or through the development of pathologies resulting from chronic stress. Cow-calf
separation can occur as the result of chase and capture, and it is likely that this separation
will result in the calf's death, at least for younger calves. Further, it appears that young
animals may be particularly vulnerable to impacts of fisheries operations. Maternal
separation and novelty are likely to induce significant hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
response in young animals, and this can result in impaired growth." NMFS Report to
Congress, AR, Tab 73 at 2141-42.
9.
See Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2001).
10. Id. at 1060.
11. Id
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. George A. Chmael II, Esq. and Nancy E. Whiteman, Esq., Caught in the Net of

2001]

Brower v. Evans

purse seine nets are thrown around both the dolphins and the tuna and the
netting is tightened at the bottom to prevent the tuna from escaping, thus
also capturing the dolphins. 5 From 1959 to 1972,6 purse seine tuna fishing killed millions of dolphins by asphyxiation from entanglement in the
nets or during the hauling of the nets back to the fishing vessel. 7
In 1972"8 the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) 9 was enacted
in response to public outrage over the deaths of dolphins as well as other
marine mammals.2" Prior to the Act, the National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) studies indicated that three ETP dolphin stocks were
depleted:2" the coastal dolphin, the northeastern offshore spotted dolphin,
and the eastern spinner dolphin.2 2 The Act created the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) and authorized it to regulate tuna purse seine

fishing. NMFS is a branch of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), housed in the Department of Commerce.23
Although dolphin setting was still used during the 1970's and 1980's,
the number of dolphin mortalities decreased dramatically because of the
new legislation.'
Amendments to the MMPA in 1984,25 1988,26 and

Environmental Law and Policy, Moral Outrage versus Cool Analysis in the ETP TunaDolphin Controversy, 6 U. BALT. J. ENVTL L. 163, 166 (1998).
15. Carol J. Miller and Jennifer L. Croston, WTO Scrutiny v. EnvironmentalObjectives:
Assessment of the InternationalDolphin ConservationProgramAct, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 73,
74 (1999).
16. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001).
17. See Chmael, supra note 14, at 166-67.
18. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1060. In 1972, an estimated 423,678 dolphins were
killed each year due to purse seine net fishing. Twenty years later, the number had decreased
to 15,550. Id. at 1061.
19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (1994).
20. "The MMPA directed the Secretary of the Treasury to 'ban the importation of
commercial fish or products from fish which have been caught with commercial fishing
technology which results in the incidental kill or incidental serious injury ofocean mammals
in excess of United States Standards."' Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1060-61.
21. Brower v. Daley, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1073-74 (N.D. Cal. 2000). The dolphin
stocks are deemed "depleted" when the stock falls below the "optimum sustainable
population" (OSP). "OSP is defined as a range of population levels between maximum net
productivity and carrying capacity-i.e. the historic marine mammal stock levels prior to
extensive development of the tuna purse seine fishery." Id. at 1074 n.2 (citing 16 U.S.C. §
1362(9)). "A species falls below its OSP if its population is less than 60 percent of its
estimated 'historic' levels." ld (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 72,178 (1980)).
22. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2001).
23. Chmael, supra note 14, at 171.
24. Id. at 171. Such regulations included requiring vessels to use rescue rafts and
divers to assist dolphins caught in nets and technological improvements to the purse seine
methods. Id.
25. Fishing Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-364, § 101, 98 Stat. 440 (1984). See also
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199227 added further bans against the importation of tuna caught by
international vessels which did not follow the United States' guidelines that
were designed to protect dolphins.2"
Congressional acts and international agreements during the past decade
indicate that the United States has increased pressure on other nations to
comply with the United States' fishing guidelines to eliminate dolphin kills
in the ETP 2 9 In 1992, the United States and other nations signed the
International Dolphin Conservation Program (the La Jolla Agreement)"
which banned, effective June 1, 1994, the sale or transportation of tuna that
was not "dolphin safe."'" The 1995, La Jolla Agreement, which was
formalized as the Panama Declaration,32 was intended to further dolphin
protection on an international level and to lower dolphin mortality to

H.R. No. 758, 98" Cong. 2nd Sess., 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 635, 638.
26. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-711, § 4,
102 Stat. 4755 (1988). See H.R. REP. No. 970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-19 (1984),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154, 6155-59.
27. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371(a)(2)(B) & 1411(1992).
28. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1061. In 1990, Congress created the Dolphin
Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA), which furthered the protection of ETP
dolphins by mandating that tuna sold in the United States can not have a "dolphin safe" label
if the tuna was caught using purse seine nets that entrapped the dolphins. Id. (citing 16
U.S.C. § 1385). "Intentional false labeling of tuna products could result in a civil penalty
of up to $100,000."

See Jennifer Ramach, Note, Dolphin-Safe Tuna Labeling: Are the

DolphinsFinallySafe? 15 VA. ENVTL L.J. 743, 751-752 (1996). 'Tuna was considered
'dolphin safe' if it was: (1) caught in the ETP, but with a small vessel that did not
intentionally set on dolphins; (2) caught outside the ETP, using purse seine fishing methods,
but accompanied by a written statement certified by the captain stating no nets were
intentionally set on or encircled dolphins; or (3) not harvested by a vessel engaged in driftnet
fishing (seining)." Carol J. Miller and Jennifer L. Croston, WTO Scrutiny v. Environmental
Objectives, Assessment of the InternationalDolphin Conservation ProgramAct, 37 AM.

Bus. L. J. 73, 99 (1999) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1417 (d)).
29. See Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1061.
30. "The La Jolla Agreement established an International Review Panel to review
compliance with the standards, and to verify annual performance of individual vessels.
Members included representatives of governments, the fishing industry, and environmental
organizations." Carol J. Miller and Jennifer L. Croston, WTO Scrutiny v. Environmental
Objectives: Assessment of the InternationalDolphin Conservation ProgramAct, 37 AM.

Bus. L. J. 73, 108 (1999) (referring to Agreement for the Reduction of Dolphin Mortality
in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, June, 1992, done at La Jolla Calif., reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 936
(1994)).
31. Miller, supra note 30, at 97.
32. Id. See also Rachel C. Hampton, Note, Note of Dolphinsand Tuna: The Evolution
to an InternationalAgreement, 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 99 (1998). The Panama Declara-

tion added slight changes to the La Jolla Agreement. The former established a limit on
mortality rates for dolphin stocks rather than a limit based on the total dolphin population.
Id. at 139.
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acceptable levels. This would be accomplished by establishing a new
"dolphin safe" labeling standard that allowed tuna caught with purse seine
nets to carry the "dolphin safe" label only where dolphins were not visibly
killed during the set.33
In 1997, to enforce the Panama Declaration domestically and to amend
the MMPA, Congress enacted the International Dolphin Conservation
Program Act (IDCPA).34 The IDCPA lifted the ban on countries adhering
to the Act. 5 However, Congress did not accept the language of the Panama Agreement that would have lowered the standard for a dolphin safe
label.36 The IDCPA also reflected congressional concern that the mortality
of dolphins was not the only cause of dolphin stock depletion; physiological stress induced by year round tuna fishing also might have detrimental
effects on dolphin populations.37
Other nations have not always complied with the United States' fishing
standards. International lawsuits such as Tuna Dolphin 38 and Tuna

Dolphin 1139 arose from the United States' efforts to protect dolphins in the
ETP. Such attempts have violated the goals' of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 4

33. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1061.
34. Miller, supra note 15, at 110. The Act mandated the captain to guarantee that "no
dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the sets in which tuna were caught" and the
tuna were not "harvested using a purse seine net intentionally deployed on or to encircle
dolphin." Id. at 118-19 (citing Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1385 (d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(B)(i), (h) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (d)(l)(A),
(d)(2)(B)(i), (h) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
35. Brower v. Daley, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
36. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1061.
37. Id.
38. This case known as Tuna-Dolphin I, decided in 1991, held that the United States
failed to comply with the National Treatment Principle "when it prohibited the importation
and sale of Mexican-caught tuna based on the 'process' by which it was caught." Miller,
supra note 15, at 101-02 (citing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute
Settlement Panel on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1594,
1598 par. 2.1, 2.2). Furthermore, "[tihe Tuna-Dolphin I panel ruled that jurisdiction to
protect plant or animal life does not extend outside the territory of the nation implementing
the protection." Miller, supra note 15, at 103.
39. The Tuna-Dolphin 1I decision held that the United States' embargoes on tuna
products from other countries not complying with United States' standards were unnecessary. Miller, supra note 15, at 106 (citing General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade: GATT
Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, June 16, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 839).
40. The main objectives of the WTO and GATT are to encourage international trade
through limiting trade restrictions. Miller, supra note 15, at 83.
41. Id.
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There are relatively few recent cases that address the protection of
dolphins in the ETP from harmful fishing practices. The only other federal
case that addresses protection of ETP dolphins is the 1994 case, Earth
IslandInst. v. Brown.42 Other federal court cases that speak to tuna fishing
regulations regarding dolphins and porpoises are Earth Island Inst. v.
Mosbacher,43 American Tunaboat Ass'n v. Brown,44 United States v.
Hayashi,45 Kokechik Fisherman's Ass'n v. Sec'y of Commerce,46 and
Sabella v. United States.47 Defenders of Wildlife v. Dalton8 is the only
case in the last five years tried in the International Trade Court, other than
Brower v. Evans, that addressed the effect of tuna purse seine fishing on

42. 865 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. Cal. 1994). This case has enforced the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA). Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421
(holding that further taking of northeastern offshore spotted dolphin in the ETP is not
permitted even though it is not deemed to be depleted). Earth Island Inst. v. Brown, 865 F.
Supp. at 1377.
43. 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the government must comply with the
Marine Mammal Protection Act). The court upheld the trial court's decision to grant
plaintiff's injunction barring the importation of yellowfin tuna from Mexico. Id. at 1453.
44. 67 F.3d 1404 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff was restricted from using
the purse seine method of fishing when the dolphin mortality quota for the year had been

met).
45. 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that reasonable actions, those not resulting in
severe disruption of a mammal's normal routine, to deter porpoises from eating fish or bait
off a fishing line are not rendered criminal by the Marine Mammal Protection Act or its
regulations).
46. 839 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that a permit granted by the Secretary of
Commerce to a group of Japanese fishermen allowing them to take a certain number of
porpoises was contrary to the requirements of the MMPA). The court found it contrary "in
that it allowed incidental taking of various species of protected marine mammals without
first ascertaining as to each such species whether or not the population of that species was
at the OSP level. If it is appropriate to grant foreign commercial fishermen some leeway to
take marine mammals incidentally in carrying out their commercial fishing operations for
salmon, it is for the Congress, not the Secretary to decide." Id. at 802.
47. 863 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that the case was not ripe because final
agency action had not been taken). This case involved U.S. citizens employed as captains
or crew aboard tuna vessels requesting that NOAA issue a definitive statement as to whether
International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, 16 U.S.C. § 1417(a)(2) applied to United
States citizens who work as captains or crew on foreign flag tuna fishing vessels. Id. at 2.
48. No. 00-02-00060,2000 Ct. Int'l. Trade, LEXIS 130 (Ct. Intl. Trade Oct. 12,2000)
(holding that defendants must complete the administrative record under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 706, before lifting the Eastern Tropical Pacific yellowfin tuna
embargo against tuna from Mexican fishing vessels).
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dolphins.49 The Supreme Court has not reviewed cases involving the
protection of dolphins in the ETP from purse seine fishing.

M. THE SUBJECT CASE
A. FactualBackground

Current amendments to the DPCIA required that the Secretary of
Commerce's Initial and Final Findings include evidence as to "whether the
intentional deployment on or encirclement of dolphins with purse seine nets

is having a significant adverse impact on any depleted dolphin stock in the
[ETP]."' The Secretary's findings were to be based on NMFS's research
from October 1, 1997 to March 1, 1999. 5" On May 7, 1999, the Secretary
of Commerce reported in his Initial Finding mandated by the IDCPA that

there was insufficient evidence to conclude that purse seine fishing
practices, including chase and encirclement of dolphins, had a detrimental
impact on depleted stocks of dolphins.52
As a result of the Initial Finding, effective February 2, 2000, the
Secretary lowered the dolphin safe tuna label standards, allowing fishermen
to set on the dolphins and to use purse seine nets "as long as no dolphins
were observed to have been killed or seriously injured during the set."53
This standard lowered the protection of ETP dolphins to the standard which
existed prior to the 1997 enactment of the IDCPA.

49. Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Brown, is the only other federal court case
on point within the last five years, and the court found that drift nets used in the Mediterranean were causing depletion of dolphins and that defendants, U.S. Secretary of Commerce
and Secretary of State, must enforce the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, Pub.
L. No. 106-582, 106 Stat. 4900 (Nov. 2, 1992). Enforcing the act would put pressure on the
Italian government to end large scale driftnet practices. Humane Soc'y of the United States
v. Brown, 920 F. Supp. 178, 205 (Ct. Intl. Trade, 1996).
50. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1385
(g)(1) & (g)(2))
51. "NMFS found that the currently depleted populations ofboth northeastern offshore
spotted dolphins and eastern spinner dolphins were 'not increasing at the rate expected based
on the low rate of reported mortalities from the fishery since 1991 and the reproductive
potential for these populations."' Id.
52. Brower v. Daley, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
53. Id. at 1079.
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B. The District Court Opinion
In 2000, David Brower et. al' sued Secretary of Commerce William
Daley and other defendants,"5 alleging that the Secretary's Initial Finding
violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)56 and the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 7
Plaintiffs first claimed that the Secretary violated the APA in failing to
comply with the IDCPA by not using the best available evidence, by
neglecting to "undertake the mandated stress effects research," 8 and by
failing to determine whether purse seine nets had an adverse effect on the
dolphins. 59 The Secretary disputed Plaintiffs' arguments that he violated
the APA, asserting that he did not consider preliminary data from the stress
tests because the data would not be available until the Final Finding; accordingly, he based his findings on the available information.' The court
ruled in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that the Secretary delayed action,
abused his discretion, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously for the reasons
plaintiff cited.6 Further, the court held that the lack of evidence did not
justify the Secretary's decision to lower the dolphin safe tuna standard.62
The court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs on the APA claim and set aside the
Secretary's initial finding until the congressionally mandated stress
research had been reviewed.63 A preliminary injunction was denied as
moot."

As a second claim, Plaintiffs argued that the Secretary had violated
NEPA because he had not prepared an Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement, prior to issuing the Initial Finding.65 The
court found that NEPA did not apply in this case because the Secretary's
finding was a nondiscretionary act and NEPA "only applies to 'discretion-

54. Additional plaintiffs included, the Earth Island Institute, The Humane Society of
the United States, the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Defenders
ofWildlife, International Wildlife Coalition, Environmental Solutions International, Animal
Welfare Institute, Society for Animal Protective Legislation, Animal Fund, and the Oceanic
Society. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1058.
55. Brower v. Daley, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
56. Administrative Procedure Act § 7, 5 U.S.C.S. § 706 (1) & (2) (2001).
57. Brower v. Daley, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
58. Id. at 1079.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1086.
61. Id. at 1089.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1073.
65. lit at 1090 n.21.
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ary federal action."' Additionally, the court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment as to the second claim, based on Plaintiffs' inability
to cite authority where NEPA had been "applied to a scientific finding
comparable to the finding required in the case at bar."67
The Secretary raised as an affirmative defense that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the case because: (1) Plaintiffs did not have standing to
bring the claim; and (2) this case was not ripe and could not be reviewed
because it was not a final agency action." The court held that the case was
ripe and that the Secretary's decision was a final agency action.6 9
C. The Appeals Court Opinion
In December 2000, the Secretary of Commerce appealed the district
court's summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.70 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit addressed two issues: (1) whether the international trade ramifications outweighed the domestically mandated protection of dolphins; and (2)
whether the Secretary violated the APA in his administration of the
71
IDCPA.
The court summarily dismissed the Secretary's first argument, that
because this case had international implications its results, although
inconsistent with protecting the dolphins, outweighed the security of these
mammals. 72 The court concluded that such an issue is outside the court's
authority, holding that Congress, not the judicial branch, has jurisdiction
over such claims. 3
The court then addressed whether the Secretary violated the APA
through his actions with the IDCPA by delaying action, 74 abusing his
discretion, and acting arbitrarily and capriciously and not in accordance
with the law. 75 The Secretary maintained that he did not violate the APA
by using an improper legal standard to enact the less protective dolphin safe
label. The Secretary had found that there was insufficient information to

66. Id. at 1090 (quoting Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1512 (1995)).
67. Brower v. Daley, 93 F. Supp. 2d. at 1090.
68. Id. at 1079.
69. Id. at 1081. The Secretary has determined the date when the new dolphin safe tuna
label standard will be effective and that date has been passed by Congress. Id. at 1082.
70. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001).
71. Id at 1065-66. The first issue was raised by the Secretary and other amicus curiae
briefs. However, the first issue is not the main issue on appeal.
72.
73.

Id.
Id at 1066.

74.
75.

Id. at 1068-70.
Id. at 1070.
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determine whether or not fishing has a destructive effect on the ETP
dolphin stock.76 He argued that IDCPA guidelines were met, even though
he had enacted the less protective label, because he had found insufficient
evidence that purse seine fishing has an adverse effect on dolphins.V The
court stated that under the Secretary's reasoning he could enact a less
protective dolphin labeling as a default standard, if he failed to find
evidence establishing that purse seine fishing has a negative effect on
dolphins. 7 The appellate court upheld the district court's decision, holding that the Secretary must affirmatively determine the impact or lack of
impact from purse seine nets, or from the intentional deployment or
encirclement of dolphins.79
The court addressed in greater detail the second issue of whether the
Secretary violated the APA when he "failed to obtain and consider
preliminary data from any of the mandated stress research projects" in his
Initial Finding.'0 The Secretary claimed that the Initial Finding could be
made using limited evidence and that he had the discretion to conduct the
studies after the Initial Finding.8 ' The Secretary contended that the district
court erred in finding that NMFS unreasonably delayed the stress studies.
He claimed that the delay for the test involving the necropsy samples was
not his responsibility.8 2 Brower claimed that under the APA,83 the Secretary "abused his discretion, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by
failing to find significant adverse impact given the best available
evidence."'" The court dismissed the Secretary's arguments, asserting that
the explicit language of the statute makes it clear that conducting the stress
tests was a prerequisite to the issuance of an Initial Finding. 5 Further, the
court concluded that the Secretary did not have discretion to schedule the
stress studies after the Initial Finding and that he unreasonably delayed the
stress studies.8 6

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1067.
79. Id
80. Id. at 1064.
81. Id. at 1068.
82. The Secretary argued that the delay was due to the lack of cooperation from nonUnited States vessels. However, the Report to Congress demonstrates Mexico's efforts to
cooperate with the United States. id at 1069.
83. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
84. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d, 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2001).
85. Id at 1068.
86. Id. at 1070.
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IV. DISCUSSION

This Note supports the court's reasoning that Defendants should have
followed the IDCPA's procedures, and that in failing to adhere to IDCPA
guidelines the Secretary of Commerce violated the APA. For the court to
review an agency action under the APA, that action must be final.8 7 For
the agency's action to be regarded as "final" under the APA, the Supreme
Court held that it must meet the following two provisions: "[flirst, the
action must mark the 'consummation' of the agency's decision making
process" and "second, the action must be one by which 'rights or obligations have been determined,' or from which 'legal consequences will
flow.'"88

One of the court's main purposes is to interpret statutes.89 In this case
the court accorded deference to Congress and concluded that "[fin
construing federal statutes, we presume that the ordinary meaning of the
words chosen by Congress accurately express its legislative intent. ' 90 The
meaning of a statutory provision can be interpreted from the entirety of a
statute's purpose, and by determining "whether the proposed interpretation
would frustrate or advance that purpose."91
Addressing the first issue of whether the Secretary used the proper
legal standard to make his Initial Finding under IDCPA Section 1385(g),
the court compared the language of the statute to the Secretary's interpretation of the statute. 92 The court concluded that the Secretary incorrectly
interpreted the word "whether" in the following provision:
Between March 1, 1999, and March 31, 1999, the Secretary shall,
on the basis of the research conducted before March 1, 1999, under
section 304(a) of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 [16
USCS § 1414a(a)] information obtained under the International
Dolphin Conservation Program, and any other relevant information
make an initial finding regarding whether the intentional deployment on or encirclement of dolphins with purse seine nets is having

87 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
88. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).
89. "An agency's interpretation or application of a statute is a question of law reviewed
de novo." Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1064 (citing Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920,923

(9th Cir. 1998)).
90.

Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1065.

91.

Id.

92.

hi at 1066.
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a significant adverse impact on any depleted dolphin stock in the
93

[ETP].

The court concluded that "whether" should be read as "whichever of the
two,"'94 meaning that the Secretary should have found that "'yes' there was
a significant adverse impact, or 'no' there was no significant adverse
impact."95 Instead the Secretary found a lack of evidence that the purse
seine fishing had an adverse impact on the dolphins.'
The court used proper reasoning in reaching its conclusion. The
ordinary meaning of words in a statute can naturally be found in a dictionary. Although the court did not cite any authority other than Webster's
Dictionary97 to substantiate the reasoning, it is consistent with other federal
98
court cases. For example, the holding in Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton
hinged on the definition of the word "extinct," and the court used the
definition from the Oxford English Dictionaryto substantiate its reasoning. 9
Next, the court addressed Congress's intended meaning for the
IDCPA.' The Supreme Court has held that, in reviewing an agency's
interpretation of a statute, courts should "reject those constructions that are
contrary to clear congressional intent or frustrate the policy that Congress
sought to implement."' O' Applying the Supreme Court's standard, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that, based on Congress's reluctance to accept the
less protective standard used in the Panama Declaration, Congress would
also be reluctant to adopt the less restrictive standard in this case."0 2
This argument was convincing because the facts surrounding the two
decisions were similar. Congress did not lower the standard at the time of
the Panama Declaration. Instead Congress awaited evidence of a possible
connection between purse seine fishing and the physiological stress on
dolphins.'0 3 Although more information regarding the possible connection

93.
94.

16 U.S.C. § 1385(g)(1).
Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1066 (citing MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICrIONARY (10th ed. 1993)).

95.
96.
97.

Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1066.
Id.at 1059.
id. at 1066.

98. 258 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001).
99. Id
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1385(g)(1) (1992),
101. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1065 (referencing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,
104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984)).
102 Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1067.
103. Id. at 1061.
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was available to the Secretary, he did not use the studies in reaching his
Initial Finding.'4
Next, the court reasoned that the Secretary's legal standard was a
"default construction [that] should be avoided because it would lead to
absurd results. '0 5 The court properly applied the holding of Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors,Inc., in which the Supreme Court held that the
default reasoning should not be used where it would lead to an absurd
result."°7 Likewise, the court was correct that if the Secretary is allowed
to defer to the default guidelines while research is pending, there is no
incentive for the Secretary to expedite the research.108 The court, however,
overstepped a reasonable analysis in concluding that once the lower
standard was in place, the Secretary would be reluctant to remove the
standard and he would receive pressure to keep the labeling standard for the
Final Finding." In order to make the Final Finding, the Secretary would
have to rely on scientific evidence and thus it seemed highly illogical to
conclude that the Secretary would be able to keep the same lower standard
if evidence supported a contrary conclusion.
Further, the court addressed the issue of whether the Secretary was
required by law to follow the IDCPA guidelines. In Natural Resources
Defense Council v. EPA, 0 the Ninth Circuit concluded that executive
agencies must adhere to the law and the court must uphold this rule."'
Thus, the court properly concluded that the Secretary should have followed
the IDCPA's guidelines to commence and to review the following stress
tests before the Initial Finding was reached:
(1) literature review of relevant research;
(2) three-year series of dolphin necropsy samples obtained by
commercial vessels;
(3) a one-year review of relevant historical demographic and
biological data; and
(4) an experiment involving repeated chasing and capturing of
dolphins by means of intentional encirclement." 2
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107.
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109.
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112.

Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1067 (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,575 (1982)).
458 U.S. 564 (1982).
Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1067.
Id.
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966 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1300.
Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1062.
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Next, the court analyzed the Secretary's assertion that he did not violate
the APA by unreasonably delaying" 3 the stress studies or by failing to collect and analyze data from the stress studies. This court used the factors
from Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr v. FCC (TRAC)," 4 to
decide whether NMFS unreasonably delayed the studies."' "[Clourts
generally apply the so-called TRAC factors in deciding whether to order
relief in claims of agency delay brought under the APA.""' 6 Some of these
factors are as follows:
(3)

delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic
regulations are less tolerable when human health and welfare
are at stake
(4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed
action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority
(5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent
of the interests prejudiced by the delay." 7
The issue before the court, although not involving human health and
welfare, did involve the welfare of highly intelligent mammals-dolphins,
the welfare of which was compromised by the delay in research.
"At the time of the Initial Finding, NMFS had commenced and
completed only the literature review."" 8 The over 500 biopsies from the
one-year study should have been used to determine fishing related stress on
the ETP dolphins.'
These biopsies were not even considered for the
Initial Finding. " Further, NMFS delayed research on the chase and recapture project for two years after Congress requested the study.' The court
properly concluded that the Secretary violated the APA when he "unreasonably delayed action" and "abused his discretion and acted arbitrarily and
capriciously and not in accordance with the law" when he did not consider
the relevant evidence before determining the Initial Finding.'

113. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1994).
114. 720 F.2d 70 (1984).
115. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1068.
116. Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing
TRAC, 750 F.2d at 79-80).
117. Id. at 507 n.7 (quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80).
118. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1069.
119. See id.
120. Id
121. Id. at 1070.
122. Id.
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The court further concluded that the Secretary did not use the "best
available evidence" standard. 123 Connerv. Burford12 held that incomplete
information about a study does not justify failing to comply with a statute
that mandates a thorough opinion using the best information available.'25
The Secretary's findings were contrary to the results of the Report, 26 which
covered the abundance study and the stress literature review. 127 Thus, the
court properly held that the Secretary should have used the information in
the Report to conclude that dolphins are adversely affected by the fishing.
The statutory language of the IDCPA, the Secretary's failure to
commence the mandated studies, and the "best available information" all
indicate that the Secretary violated the previously mentioned sections of the
APA. Overall, the court arrived at the proper conclusion.
V. CONCLUSION

The court properly asserted that government officials, such as the
Secretary of Commerce, need to comply with congressional acts. The
outcome of this case was refreshing because the environment is often given
secondary consideration to political issues such as international trade. This
case will be helpful to environmentalists who bring future claims against
the government for violating congressional statutes at the expense of the
environment. Further, Brower v. Evans conveys the message that

123. See id. at 1070-71.
124. 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988).
125. Id at 1454. The report available to the Secretary before the issuance of the Initial
Finding concluded: "Chase and capture operations of the fishery are likely to cause
immediate or short-term physiological responses such as activation of the hypothalamicpituitary-adrenal axis in response to psychological or social stressors associated with these
operations." Brower v. Daly, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting the
Secretary's Report at 2141-42 (emphasis added by the court)).
126. NMFS found that northeastern offshore spotted dolphins and eastern spinner
dolphins were "not increasing at the rate expected based on the low rate of reported
mortalities from the fishery since 1991 and the reproductive potential for these populations."
Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d at 1062-63. The report did not give concrete data for the
depleted stock of northeastern offshore spotted and eastern spinner dolphins because of the
trouble with identifying causes other than fishing to slow population growth of the dolphins.
The only non-fishing related factor that it named was a possible environmental change in the
ocean habitat. Furthermore, the report refuted this explanation because there is a lack of
evidence that there is a large scale change in oceanographic habitat. Id. at 1063.
127. The stress literature review indicates there is a likelihood that the fishing creates
physiological stress, which affects dolphin population growth. Id. "We believe that research on the effects of human activities on dolphins demonstrates that it is highly likely that
the activities of the [ETP] tuna fleets are causing significant negative impacts on dolphins
in addition to the direct mortalities counted by observers." Id. at 1064 n.6.
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government officials need to strictly adhere to provisions in congressional
statutes that are designed to protect certain depleted species. The holding
in this case is consistent with the court's ruling in previous cases that
"[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied
by money damages, and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e.,
irreparable. If such injury is sufficiently likely.., the balance of harms
will usually favor... protect[ing] the environment.",128

128. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 975 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(quoting Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987)).

